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The US television programme ‘My Strange Addiction’ (TLC, 2010) is about ordinary American citizens who deal with ‘strange’ behaviours such as eating laxatives, wearing a bunny costume in public, or treating a life-sized doll as a real person. Lori (Episode 1) sleeps with her hair dryer turned on every night. The hair dryer has taken her husband’s place in her bed. He has left her because he could not stand the noise level. After 01:30 minutes into the programme, she explains the past and how she developed her addiction: ‘I was eight years old when the first time I remember sleeping with my blow dryer. I used to share a bed with my older sister Tami and she, one night, turned on this blow dryer. And the sound of it, the warmth of it, just instantly put me to sleep and from that night forward, I was hooked.’ (01:30-01:36). Lori is ‘very addicted to the heat and the sound.’ (09:46-09:47). In short: ‘The blow dryer has become a part of who I am.’ (09:45). Of course, she wants to change. As with many other reality television programmes, the programme is about a process of conversion and transformation until, finally, Lori is shown having left her blow dryer behind. As part of the show, the participants are seen by experts and encouraged to utter signifiers that relate to responsibility, will power and agency. Lori expresses, facing the camera: ‘I have admitted I have a problem and now it’s just about the steps to overcome it.’ (17:02-17:06).
The dominance and increase of reality television in general and shows that focus on a subject’s bodily and mental health in particular over the last decade have been explained by scholars as phenomena that come with reflexive modernity (Giddens 1991), the Psy disciplines (Rose 1990) and a neoliberal culture of self-responsibility (Richards 2007, McRobbie 2009) and self-help. Our age is saturated with ideas of the therapeutic (Furedi 2004; Richards 2007; Yates 2011; Johanssen 2012). This ‘therapy culture’ (Furedi 2004) stands for a shift towards public utterances and displays of sufferance and how they can be overcome. Media, and in particularly reality television, serve as a looking glass for audiences. As they are watching others, supposedly real people, they are in turn observing and watching themselves. Seeing others and their problems helps us make sense of our own. Barry Richards claims that this process can be viewed as therapeutic because television is a platform that can potentially allow us to work through our own problems and anxieties (Richards 2007). The therapeutic implies here that individual problems are addressed, faced and overcome (Richards 2007; Yates 2011; Johanssen 2012). Reality and makeover television are the prime example of the idea that subjects can be transformed into healthier, productive citizens. The notion of the therapeutic is not only present in popular culture but also in medical and scientific discourses, such as posthumanism. Before, shifting the focus on to posthumanism, another angle needs to be included here: medicine. Brown and Webster (2004) describe the history of Western medicine as a shift towards body parts that are being substituted by other body parts or artificially created devices that merge the body with the machine e.g. a cardiac pacemaker. The body is not only maintained to a healthy state through medical intervention, instead it is pushed to new limits aided by technology: 
Today, maintaining the body is a problem of technological apprehension or capture requiring the production of new systems for codification, storage, accessibility and distribution. Brown and Webster 2004, 80 

The very future of this maintenance is envisioned by posthumanism. Pushing the boundaries of what the human body can and should be capable of to its very limits, it has become a growing discourse about the ethics of human transformation through medicine, information and communication technologies and science more generally. It is particularly medical research that has overturned traditional boundaries of inner and outer, external and internal, overthrowing these dichotomies with a promise of possibilities. This has led to ‘humans and non-humans’ being in ‘a constant state of mutual redefinition’ (Brown and Webster 2004, 107). This redefinition is attempted by popular culture and posthumanism alike. 

2. Therapeutic Posthumanism  
The reading of the literature on posthumanism for this chapter is selective. It only focuses on a certain aspect of posthumanism: the notion that posthumanism can alter human subjectivity. Technology will improve the bodies of posthumans and that it will ultimately eliminate problems related to physical and mental health. There is no single definition of the term ‘posthumanism’. The literature on the topic is extensive and the discourse itself is heterogeneous (Pepperell 2003; Miah 2008). I will concentrate in this chapter​[1]​  on the enthusiasts of posthumanism. Implications of these positions will be discussed from a psychoanalytic point of view. Finally my critique of posthumanism will be embedded in wider notions of the therapeutic and the Freudian idea of negation. 
According to Pepperell (2003) the notion of posthumanism can be regarded as a triangle. Firstly, posthumanism refers to an age that in the sense of the word comes after humanism; secondly it denotes that the traditional thoughts, mainly by western philosophy, of what the human subject actually is, are being challenged; thirdly, it implies the idea that technology and humans become more and more intertwined. This results in the need of a redefinition of the term ‘human’. I will focus on the third part of the triangle in this chapter.
A certain tradition in the discourse on posthumanity (or transhumanity as it is often called) believes that posthumanism might serve as a way of improving our bodies and brains more particularly. In that sense the human is superseded by a new human or cyborg. A key contribution to the critical study of what posthumanism means was made by N. Katherine Hayles (1999). She argued that bodies are more and more being translated into information, digital data and non-matter. The body itself is being reconfigured as something that is not defined by flesh alone. Unlike Fukuyama (2002), who I will discuss later on, Hayles celebrates the potentials of posthumanism similarly to Donna Haraway (1985). What counts as an able, healthy or normal life is being challenged. For Hayles then, posthumanism is about ‘bodies losing their boundaries’ (Miah 2008, 78). It is about challenging ‘what being human means’ (Halyes 1999, 285). 
The positions that will form the basis of the chapter are less nuanced and theoretically driven. Instead they speak of the direct applications of posthumanism, or how a posthuman future can look like. These enthusiastic positions all share the vision that ‘genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, robotics and nanotechnology will […] allow us to conquer disease, eliminate unhappiness, end scarcity and postpone, perhaps indefinitely, death itself.’ (Rubin 2008, 137). For instance, we could have a chip implanted into our brain that could ‘improve [our] memory’ (Caplan 2006, 36). Bostrom outlines further future possibilities:
A massive increase in funding for research to better understand the basic biology of ageing could pay off handsomely if it leads to treatments to intervene in the negative aspects of senescence, allowing men and women to stay healthy and economically productive much longer than is currently possible. Bostrom 2006, 49

Science and technology can lead to productive and responsible subjects who can work for longer without being hampered by ageing bodies and slower working brains. Klerkx (2006) summarises the enthusiastic approach held by many posthumanists:
These days, transhumanists take many forms: from nanotech enthusiasts who envision armies of microscopic robots inside our bodies, forever detecting and destroying disease, to head-freezing cryonicists who believe that science will one day revive the dead. But all share a basic belief that would undoubtedly resonate with Metchnikoff: that as technology and medicine advance, humans will live significantly longer and healthier lives while realising greater intellectual and social achievements. Klerkx 2006, 60

One of the most prominent advocates of transhumanism and biotechnology, Ray Kurzweil (2005), asks what the consequences will be once ‘nonbiological intelligence predominates’ (Kurzweil 2005, 201). 
He argues that subjectivity is to a large extent defined by consciousness and the future posthumans are also going to be conscious subjects. Kurzweil stresses that technological developments will result in a shift from biological to nonbiological humanity:
A third, and the most compelling, scenario involves the gradual but inexorable progression of humans themselves from biological to nonbiological. That has already started with the benign introduction of devices such as neural implants to ameliorate disabilities and disease. It will progress with the introduction of nanobots in the bloodstream, which will be developed initially for medical and antiaging applications. Later more sophisticated nanobots will interface with our biological neurons to augment our senses, provide virtual and augmented reality from within the nervous system, assist our memories, and provide other routine cognitive tasks. We will then be cyborgs, and from that foothold in our brains, the nonbiological portion of our intelligence will expand its powers exponentially. Kurzweil 2005, 252

All these quotes testify to a kind of final working through. Indeed as humans have turned into cyborgs, there is no need for any working through in the Freudian sense anymore.  The posthumans will, with the help of technology, be more intelligent and able to think in a ‘finer’ (ibid, 253) way. Humans will have overcome all illnesses and problems thanks to microchips and nanobots. Kevin Warwick (who calls himself the ‘first cyborg’) speaks about the possibilities of biotechnology in this context:
I feel when somebody has a problem with the way their brain is working, technology directly integrated with the brain, can help, can overcome some problems that people have. [...] Possibly something like schizophrenia in the future. But implants into the brain open up the possibility of enhancing, enhancing the way we think, maybe making sure, you do not eat that chocolate cake that you want. So keeping your body regulated. Warwick 2010, n.p.  

It needs to be stressed here that these accounts are not completely illusionary. They cannot be dismissed as irrelevant (Gordijn and Chadwick 2008). It is the desire that they articulate that is problematic, as I will argue in the following section. As Webster and Brown (2004) show, there are already highly sophisticated devices in place that regulate and initiate sequences inside the body, such as releasing drug dosages at a given time, or generating oscillating vibrations to stimulate nerves (ibid, 119). A lot of things are already possible – but apparently not enough. The kind of future and its possibilities that is addressed in these quotes has itself been debated in the academy and popular culture. One of the most prominent critiques of posthumanism being Francis Fukuyama (2002). In ‘Our Posthuman Future’, he argued that the danger in posthumanism lies within a replacement of humanism. This kind of humanism – ethics, dignity, equality – is replaced by commercial interests that lead to stronger inequality. This idea is already being debated in popular culture in cases such as ‘designer babies’ or stem cell research (Miah 2008, 73) that can lead to medicine being more and more profit driven. Even though Fukuyama’s critique is overall generalising and not nuanced, he makes an important point. Crucially, the above quotes all advocate a level of enhancement ‘beyond levels that are considered normal’ (Sharon 2014, 58). They pose the danger of medical technologies that are employed for nonmedical uses. In the case of the ‘designer babies’ that were mentioned earlier, this means for instance that preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) – a technique to screen embryos for serious genetic or life threatening conditions – is increasingly utilised for ‘cosmetic’ (ibid, 60) purposes such as determining a baby’s sex. These practices have been regarded as a new eugenics by some (Habermas 2003; Sharon 2014).  
The danger of posthumanism is that potentially what is being regarded as normal can be seen as abnormal in the future. To posthumanists, the desire to have that chocolate cake, Kevin Warwick speaks of, needs to be corrected. It needs to be repressed by an implanted chip.

3. Blowing Your Weak Soul Out
We can conclude from the above accounts that they testify of a negation. Contemporary society can be described as a society that negates the unconscious to a large extent​[2]​. In the logic of part of the posthumanist discourse, posthumans have to better humans. And they can only be posthuman, literally in the sense of the word, if they have left their unconscious behind. Posthumans dream of a subject that has no strange desires, psychoses, neuroses or even worries. In their logic, we can only enjoy our age of posthumanity if one major characteristic that makes us human is taken from us: a limited, de-centered, uneasy, unclear sense of subjectivity. It is no coincidence then that so many enthusiasts of posthumanism stress the ‘applied reason’ (Rubin 2008, 140) that is dominant in their ideas. In that sense ‘the very goal of the movement is overcoming the constraints of the human, constraints which define the character of our moral world.’ (ibid, 154). The workings of the body and brain are to be like those of a computer: durable, efficient, productive, calculable and repeatable. 
The reality television narrative of self-help and overcoming and the posthuman narratives of ended sufferance both share a vocabulary that speaks of wishes to eradicate human suffering once and for all. These ideas of the therapeutic are in fundamental opposition to how psychoanalysis understands therapy and the therapeutic. Freud regarded psychoanalysis as a method of reduction of suffering. Psychoanalysis cannot completely transform a patient and bring total happiness. As Freud bluntly put it: ‘[Happiness] is quite incapable of being realised; all the institutions of the universe are opposed to it.’ (Freud 2004, 16). Instead psychoanalysis should function as guidance for patients to achieve ‘common unhappiness’ (Breuer and Freud 1955, 305). The very notion of ‘overcoming’ is rejected by psychoanalytic thinkers. It is never possible to completely overcome your symptoms. In psychoanalytic thinking, mental and physical suffering is often expressed in symptoms: actions or thoughts that are a sign of something beneath a subject’s surface. Suffering is something that needs to be held onto in order to understand it and look for ways to live with it or at least differently with it. As Levine puts it:
The therapist attends to the suffering of the soul, its psycho-pathology. The therapist attends to its suffering, pays attention to it and helps it to show itself, to present itself, to become present. In so doing, the suffering becomes a present, a gift to be treasured. This is hard to hold onto; we want to eliminate the pain, but perhaps the pain is part of the gift – if we could find a way to hold it, a way to be with it and not run away from it. Levine 2009, 26-27

The two phenomena examined in this chapter, reality television’s Lori case and posthumanism, imply one thing: we are not to be unhappy! We should not have any mental problems, disorders or concerns. Our culture is to some extent unquestionably posthuman. In so far, as it negates fundamental aspects of human subjectivity: fears, concerns and above all irrationality. The real (post)human then ‘is achieved by escaping or repressing not just its animal origins in nature, the biological, and the evolutionary, but more generally by transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether.’, according to Cary Wolfe (2009, xv). 
Fears and affective moments are all deeply rooted in any subject and partly in her unconscious according to psychoanalytic theory. If, as reality television and posthumanism, suggest our miserable, weak souls can be blown away, be it by technological advancement or just with a blow dryer, what is at stake here? 

4. The Absence  
In his 1925 essay ‘Negation’, Sigmund Freud describes negation as a conscious denial of certain facts or memories. He calls negation a ‘kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed’ (Freud 1989, 667). It is an active move towards repression. This is precisely how the posthuman discourse operates. In writing of ‘nanobots’, ‘improvements’, ‘health’, ‘productivity’, ‘achievements’, the ‘nonbiological’, ‘augmented reality’, ‘regulation’ or ‘augmentation’ (all taken from the four posthumanism quotes reproduced earlier), the therapeutic functions in reverse. In a similar manner to the posthumanists, Lori speaks of having ‘overcome’ her addiction to the blow dryer. Both are actively negating the fears of the subject of anxieties or signs of imperfection. It is these signifiers that are the, what Freud calls, material that is part of negation: ‘With the help of the symbol of negation, thinking frees itself from the restrictions of repression and enriches itself with material that is indispensable for its proper functioning.’ (ibid, 668). These discourses prove to be therapeutic in so far as they shift the subject’s focus to the bright sides of life and enable a justification in itself of the negation. Lori has overcome the blow dryer and does not need to think of it as a symptom or what problems lay behind her so-called addiction. Ray Kurzweil and other enthusiasts of posthumanism do not need to think about their neuroses because they have the potentials of the cyborg to look forward to. Both Lori’s / reality television’s discourse and the posthuman discourse imply a state of not yet. A state of humanity that is (realistically or unrealistically) envisioned to become total reality in the future. 
With negation the question of ‘whether something which is in the ego as a presentation can be rediscovered in perception (reality) as well.’ (Freud 1989, 668) arises. In other words, Lori and the posthumanists are convinced, or rather have made themselves convinced, that they have or can really overcome the cracks in the human condition. Their signifiers are grounded in external, empirical phenomena. Fundamentally, what is being negated by all the signifiers referenced is the unconscious and the very existence of symptoms. It is useful to bring in Jacques Lacan [1966] (2002) at this point and his notions of the unconscious and the signifier.
Generally symptoms always relate to speech (and vice versa). In symptoms ‘speech is driven out of the concrete [symbolic] discourse that orders consciousness’ (Lacan 2002, 51). A symptom is a signifier in itself that relates to a repressed or negated signified. Lacan refers to language, or the word as a ‘presence made of absence’ (ibid, 228). ‘Through what becomes embodied only by being the trace of a nothingness and whose medium thus cannot be altered, concepts, in preserving the duration of what passes away, engender things.’ (ibid, 228). These sentences are important in order to understand Lacan’s conception of language that draws on semiotics. For him, not the signified (the thing a word relates to) is important but the signifier, the concept, for it always relates to something that is not really there. As Lacan writes in ‘The Seminar on the Purloined Letter’: ‘For the signifier is a unique unit of being which, by its very nature, is the symbol of but an absence.’ (Lacan 2002, 17). 
In addition, signifiers can often acquire a completely arbitrary status. Most of the words I have borrowed from the posthumanists above have, what Martin Kurthen (2009) has called, an ‘as-if-status’ (Kurthen 2009, 33) in relation to posthumanism. ‘They only pretend how it would be to have certain signifieds. And by only pretending they lose their referential or ‘pointing’ character […]’ (ibid, italics in original). These signifiers are used in so many different contexts and situations (science, popular culture, medicine, etc.) that they have become uncoupled from their (supposedly) signifieds. 
In the example of Lori, the signifiers, in these cases the hair dryer and also the ‘overcome’, relate to something that is not there or that the subject does not know of or cannot articulate or symbolise. The fact that Lori ‘sleeps with’ the phallic object of the hair dryer is quite striking but more importantly her sentence ‘The blow dryer has become a part of who I am.’ can be explained with the psychoanalytic concept of identification. ‘Identification is not simple imitation but assimilation [...]; it expresses a resemblance and is derived from a common element which remains in the unconscious.’ (Freud 1900a, 150), as Freud puts it. Lori’s incorporation of the hair dryer into her being makes her posthuman as well for she is symbolically merged with the hair dryer. This identification with an object might relate to the loss of another object in Lori’s life, her mother for instance or it might be the substitute for ‘a libidinal object-tie’ (Freud 1921c, 107), as Freud argues in ‘Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego’. It is thus not surprising that Lacan speaks of a-diction, of something beyond language and speech. An addiction is the Real pursuit of something with Imaginary aims outside of the Symbolic Order. Similarly, the signifiers used by Kurzweil and co envision a reality and the posthumanists are certain that it is going to happen. There is no mention of the unconscious; neither by them, nor by Lori.
‘The unconscious is that part of concrete discourse qua transindividual which is not at the subject’s disposal in reestablishing the continuity of his conscious discourse.’ (ibid, 258), Lacan writes. Even though the unconscious cannot be uncovered or found so easily, it still leaves traces in the subject and her surroundings: in the body, in archival documents, in the subject’s particular language and style, in traditions (ibid, 215). The unconscious is thus the ‘others discourse’ (ibid, 219) that exists out there. Thus the examples I have referred to show that subjects speak in a certain discourse that is highly influenced by our cultural super-ego. This discourse is about a negation of the unconscious and the idea that it influences human subjectivity is absent from it. ‘In determining the scope of what discourse repeats, it prepares the question of what symptoms repeat.’ (ibid, 13).  The subjects on ‘My Strange Addiction’ speak that discourse and in doing so simply repeat their symptoms, their symptoms are projected onto other, less harmful, actions or objects. The posthumanists, I suggest that they do show symptoms, in their pathological look for future salvation of the human body, have turned their symptoms into a hopeful but equally simplistic vision of the perfect, posthuman body.  

5. Conclusion
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^1	  Fragments of this chapter have previously appeared in ‘Cyborg Subjects: Discourses on Digital Culture’ (Johanssen and Rambatan, 2013). It has subsequently been extensively revised.
^2	 They are actually in direct opposition to Hayles’ work on posthumanism. She posits that posthumanism is not about ‘conscious agency being in control’ but about ‘distributed cognition’ (Hayles 1999, 288). 
